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Abstract. Negotiation can be conceived as the exchange of messages
among self-interested agents in order to settle on an agreement over a
given issue. They decide which messages to send according to their pref-
erences and their evolving beliefs. Agents able to handle this dynamics
of messages and beliefs can be represented by means of Defeasible Logic
Programming augmented with utility functions. This approach to ar-
gumentation has the advantage of providing a useful platform for the
representation of beliefs and the generation of messages. The interactive
nature of negotiations requires an updating mechanism to be applied
over the knowledge bases of the agents. The features of this mechanism
are described by a protocol of a negotiation. Although there are many
possible protocols, we concentrate on one that ensures the existence of
an agreement in negotiations. The formalism of DeLP provides a very
natural approach to the characterization of such a protocol.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The design of agents able to engage in negotiations is one of the main goals in the
research on Multi-Agent Systems [LS01]. Justiﬁcations for the behavior of agents
in negotiations have been known for a long time in disciplines related to the study
of Decision-Making processes [Mye89]. Despite the eﬀorts of many authors both
in the Decision Sciences as in Multi-Agents Systems, the characterization of
precise mechanisms of interaction in negotiations has shown to be a hard problem
because, unlike markets and voting situations, the context of interaction varies
from a negotiation to another. An abstract characterization of the conditions
for mechanisms (protocols) that may ensure the convergence to agreements in
negotiations has been presented in [Toh02]. We take up some of the ideas there,
but adapted to the additional requirement of giving a precise foundation for the
internal argumentation processes carried out by each individual agent.
To represent those deliberation processes we choose an alterna-
tive form of declarative programming, Defeasible Logic Programming
(DeLP) [SCG94,Gar00,GS04]. This formalism combines Logic Programmingwith Defeasible Argumentation [Pol87,SL92,Pol95,Dun95,CML00,PV00], allow-
ing the representation of tentative knowledge and leaving for the inference
mechanism the task of ﬁnding the conclusions that the knowledge base
warrants [CDSS03]. Furthermore, we introduce Decision-Theoretic tools into
DeLP, in order to represent the fact that agents are self-interested. This is
achieved by adding preferences to the formalism of DeLP, i.e. utility consid-
erations [Lou90,TS04]. We call agents that reason using this Decision-theoretic
enhanced Defeasible Logic Programming, DDeLP agents.
We consider only two-agent negotiations, since the extension to any number
of agents follows basically the same pattern but is more involved in its syntax,
without providing extra intuitions. In this simple kind of negotiations, one agent
(by convention she is always called a1), chooses one preferred conclusion derived
from her beliefs. This conclusion represents a possible settlement for the nego-
tiation. The other agent (a2) treats this message as a query Q. Agent a2 agrees
with a1 if he can ﬁnd a warranted argument A for Q. Otherwise, he explores his
own knowledge base in order to select a new proposal to make.
If we want to ensure the convergence of the negotiation, we may impose
over the agents a protocol to guide the process of exchange of messages towards
an agreement [Lou98]. As shown in [Toh02] a suﬃcient condition for such a
protocol is its monotonicity. One consequence of this property is the absence
of cycles, understood as the repetition of messages. Since a message cannot be
repeated by either of the agents, any attempt to “convince” the other party
in the negotiation is implicitly ruled out. In fact, a monotonic protocol rather
forces an agent to accept the message of the other as a constraint.3 Therefore,
returning to our Decision-theoretic DeLP framework, if no warranted argument
for the message of the other party is found, the agent must look for at least
one rule responsible for this. From among several, she should choose the one
that yields less utility and eliminate it from the knowledge base. Although there
are other possible responses, this procedure represents a very cautious change
of beliefs of the agent. With the corrected knowledge base, which represents the
current beliefs of the agent, a message is chosen and the process repeats itself
until either a query becomes warranted or there are no longer rules to be deleted
from the knowledge base. In the ﬁrst case the negotiation is said to end in an
agreement. In the latter case, instead, it results in the breakup of the negotiation
(which can be seen as a form of degenerate agreement on not pursuing further
the negotiation).
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we will present
the rudiments of DeLP with utilities. In section 3 we introduce the protocol and
describe how it proceeds. Section 4 discusses possible extensions for this work.
2 Decision-theoretic Defeasible Logic Programming
We consider a language with three disjoint components:
3 This is a requirement shared by all known models of bargaining.– Facts, which are ground literals representing atomic information (or the
negation of atomic information).
– Strict Rules of the form L0← L1,...,Ln, where L0 is the head and {Li}i>0
is the body. Each Li in the body or the head is a literal.
– Defeasible Rules of the form L0 –≺L1,...,Ln, where L0 is the head and
{Li}i>0 is the body. Each Li in the body or the head is a literal.
Then, a Defeasible Logic Program is a set of facts, strict rules, and defeasible
rules. P = (Π,∆), where Π denotes the set of facts and strict rules, while ∆
denotes the set of defeasible rules. For each query Q there are four possible
answers: yes, no, undecided or unknown.
To determine which answer is correct, we need the notion of argument. Given
a program P = (Π,∆) and a literal L, hA,Li is an argument structure for L. A
is a set of defeasible rules in ∆ such that:
1. there exists a defeasible derivation of L from Π ∪ A. That is, there exists a
ﬁnite sequence L1,...,Ln = h of ground literals, such that each Li is either
a fact in Π or there exists a rule in Π ∪ A with Li as its head, and every
literal in the body Bj is such that Bj ∈ {Lk}k<i,
2. there is no literal P such that both P and ¬P have defeasible derivations
from Π ∪ A,
3. A is minimal, i.e., there does not exist A1 ⊆ A such that A1 satisﬁes (1)
and (2).
This framework can be enhanced by means of preferences, Φ : Π ∪ ∆ → B,
where B is an arbitrary Boolean algebra with top > and bottom ⊥. The new
elements Φ(·) and B represent explicit preferences, in the sense that given two
pieces of information µ1,µ2 ∈ Π∪∆ if µ1 is strictly more preferred than µ2 then
Φ(µ1) ÂB Φ(µ2), where ºB is the order of B. The elements of µ ∈ Π ∪∆ which
are most preferred receive a label Φ(µ) = >.
We do not assume here that Φ assigns > to all strict rules in Π, and not even
that Φ(µ1) ÂB Φ(µ2) for µ1 ∈ Π and µ2 ∈ ∆. This is because Φ(·) has, unlike
the distinction between strict and defeasible rules, no epistemic content. Instead,
the preferences represent other kinds of rationales. In particular the cost-beneﬁt
rates of the pieces of information (since their use may preclude the use of other
pieces in the reasoning process).
Whatever the reasons are for preferring elements of Π ∪ ∆, we postulate a
Boolean algebra B over which Φ(·) ranges. It can be argued that a more general
ordering could be appropriate but, as we will see, the inference engine has to
perform some operations over the labels of the pieces of information used in the
process of argumentation. In consequence, the range of Φ(·) has to be not only
an ordered set but also be closed under the logic operators
V
and
W
. This can be
easily represented by means of a Boolean algebra. In the simplest case, in which
B is just a compact subset of real numbers with the natural order, we may say
that Φ(µ) is the utility of the piece of information µ.
From the preferences over Π ∪ ∆, we can ﬁnd preferential values over de-
feasible derivations. A fact L, which can be seen as the head of a (strict) rulewith an empty body, has a value denoted V (L,∅) = Φ(L). By induction, given
rule µ (strict or defeasible) with head L and body B1,...,Bm, if L is de-
rived using µ its preferential value is V (L,µ) = Φ(µ) ∧
Vm
k=1 V (Bk). The in-
tuition here is that a conclusion is as strongly preferred as the weakest of either
its premises or the rule used in the derivation. Given a defeasible derivation
from Π ∪ ∆, LΠ∪∆(L) : L1,...,Ln = h, it yields for its conclusion L a value
V (h,LΠ∪∆(L)) = V (L,µ) where µ is the rule that yields h = Ln up from some
literals in {Lj}j<n.
By extension, an argument structure hA,Li yields a value for L, V (L,A) = V
LΠ∪A(L) V (L,LΠ∪A(L)). That is, it yields the lowest value among all the
derivations of L by using defeasible rules in A. Notice that, by deﬁnition of
A there is no other set A
0
⊂ A that allows the derivation of L, but more than
one selection of strict rules may exist in Π that allows, jointly with A, to do
that.
Let F the set of all literals that can have a defeasible derivation from Π ∪∆.
Any subset H ⊆ F has a value V (H) =
W
L∈H
V
LΠ∪∆(L) V (L,LΠ∪∆(L)). This
means that H is as valuable as the most valuable of its elements, which in turn
is as valuable as the weakest of its derivations.
With this characterization we speak of an Decision-theoretic enhanced Defea-
sible Logic Program or P
0
= (Π,∆,Φ,B) which is intended to provide answers
to queries through a process of argumentation that proceeds making compar-
isons among arguments. The main criterion of comparison used is preferential
speciﬁcity [Poo85,SL92,SGCS03,TS04]. Consider a program P
0
= (Π,∆,Φ,B)
with ΠG the set of strict rules from Π. Let F the set of all literals that can have
a defeasible derivation from Π ∪∆. Let hA1,L1i and hA2,L2i be two argument
structures with L1,L2 ∈ F. Then hA1,L1i is strictly more preferentially speciﬁc
than hA2,L2i if:
1. For all H ⊆ F, if there exists a defeasible derivation of L1 from ΠG∪H ∪A1
while ΠG ∪ H 6` L1, then L2 can be defeasibly derived from ΠG ∪ H ∪ A2,
and
2. there exists H
0
⊆ F such that there exists a defeasible derivation of h2 from
ΠG ∪ H
0
∪ A2 and ΠG ∪ H
0
6` L2 but there is no defeasible derivation of L1
from ΠG ∪ H
0
∪ A1.
3. For every H verifying (1) and H
0
verifying (2), V (H) ºB V (H
0
).
Argument hA1,L1i counterargues another hA2,L2i at a literal L if there
exists a sub-argument of hA2,L2i, hA,Li, i.e., A ⊆ A2, such that there exists a
literal P verifying both Π ∪ {L,L1} ` P and Π ∪ {L,L1} ` ¬P.
If hA1,L1i and hA2,L2i are two argument structures, hA1,L1i is a proper
preferential defeater for hA2,L2i at literal L iﬀ there exists a sub-argument of
hA2,L2i, hA,Li such that hA1,L1i counterargues hA2,L2i at L and hA1,L1i is
strictly more preferentially speciﬁc than hA,Li. Alternatively, hA1,L1i is a block-
ing preferential defeater for hA2,L2i at literal L iﬀ there exists a sub-argument
of hA2,L2i, hA,Li such that hA1,L1i counterargues hA2,L2i at L and neither
hA1,L1i is strictly more preferentially speciﬁc than hA,Li nor is hA,Li strictlymore preferentially speciﬁc than hA,Li. If hA1,L1i is either a proper or a block-
ing preferential defeater of hA2,L2i, it is said to be a preferential defeater of the
latter.
An argumentation line for an argument structure hA0,L0i is a sequence
Γ = [hA0,L0i,hA1,L1i,hA2,L2i,···] where for each i > 0 hAi+1,Li+1i is a
defeater of hAi,Lii. ΓS = [hA0,L0i,hA2,L2i,hA4,L4i,···] is the sequence of
supporting argument structures of Γ, while the sequence of interfering ones is
ΓI = [hA1,L1i,hA3,L3i,hA5,L5i,···].
An acceptable argumentation line in a defeasible program P
0
= (Π,∆,Φ,B)
is a ﬁnite sequence Γ = [hA0,L0i,··· ,hAn,Lni] such that:
1. Both ΓS and ΓI are concordant, i.e., there is no P such that both P and
¬P have defeasible derivations from Π ∪
Sb n
2 c
i=0 A2i and no P
0
with defeasible
derivations for both P
0
and ¬P
0
from Π ∪
Sb
n−1
2 c
i=0 A2i+1.
2. No argument hAk,Lki ∈ Γ is a subargument of an argument hAj,Lji, i.e.,
Ak 6⊂ Aj, for j < k.
3. For each i < n, if hAi,Lii is a blocking preferential defeater of hAi−1,Li−1i
then hAi+1,Li+1i is a proper preferential defeater of hAi,Lii.
To answer a query Q, the preferential warrant procedure builds up a candidate
argument structure hA,Qi. Then, it associates to this argument a preferential
dialectical tree ThA,Qi as follows:
1. The root of the tree is labeled, hA0,Q0i, i.e., A0 = A and Q0 = Q.
2. Let n be a non-root node, with label hAn,Qni and Γ =
[hA0,Q0i,··· ,hAn,Qni] the labels in the path from the root to n.
Let B = {hB1,H1i,··· ,hBk,Hki} be the set of all the preferential defeaters
for hAn,Qni. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, if Γ
0
= [hA0,Q0i,··· ,hAn,Qni,hBi,Hii] is an
acceptable argumentation line, n has a child ni labeled hBi,Hii. If B = ∅ or
no hBi,Hii ∈ B is such that Γ
0
is acceptable, then n is a leaf of the tree.
The nodes of ThA,Qi can be marked, yielding a tagged tree T ∗
hA,Qi as follows:
– All leaves of ThA,Qi are marked U in T ∗
hA,Qi.
– If hB,Hi is the label of a node which is not a leaf, the node will be marked U
in T ∗
hA,Qi if every child is marked D. Otherwise, if at least one of its children
is marked U, it is marked as D.
Then, given an argument hA,Qi and its associated tagged tree T ∗
hA,Qi, if the
root is marked U, the literal Q is said to be preferentially warranted. A is said
to be the preferential warrant for Q. Therefore, given a query Q the possible
answers will be:
yes, if Q is preferentially warranted;
no, if ¬Q is preferentially warranted;
undecided, if neither Q nor ¬Q are preferentially warranted;
unknown, if Q is not in the language of the program.3 Negotiation
A negotiation can be seen as the exchange of messages among agents in order
to reach an agreement over a given issue. The main elements in a negotiation
are the following:
– The possible settlements.
– The preferences over them.
– The individual beliefs about the possible results.
– The messages that can be exchanged.
The messages are chosen according to the preferences over the class of settle-
ments that are believed to be acceptable. Once a message is received, an agent
has to decide whether to accept the implied settlement or to break up the nego-
tiation or to explore for new possibilities. If the latter is the case, the agent has
to update her beliefs and choose her message according to that.
In terms of DDeLP consider a program P
0
= (Π,∆,Φ,B) where Φ = Φ1 ×
...Φn with range Bn, from which we may deﬁne the elements of a n-person
negotiation as follows:
– The possible settlements are the literals L that can be defeasibly derived
from Π ∪ ∆.
– The preferences over the literals are derived from Φ.
– The individual beliefs are subsets of Π ∪ ∆.
– The messages are the literals L plus two extra symbols, “yes” and “break”,
to indicate either agreement or the breakup of negotiations.
That is, we assume that agents consider only a certain subset of rules, from
which they select some literals as both possible settlements and as messages. We
consider only two agents, 1 and 2. Each agent i performs, at each stage t of the
negotiation, a DDeLP program hΠt
i,∆t
i,Φt
i,Bi, where Πt
i ∪∆t
i ⊆ Π ∪∆ and Φt
i
is the restriction of Φi over Πt
i ∪ ∆t
i.
At t = 1 agent a1 sends a message (a literal L1 derived from Π1
1 ∪ ∆1
1) to
agent a2. He may query his program Π2
2 ∪ ∆2
2 and if the answer is yes end
the negotiation by accepting L and sending the message “yes”. Otherwise, if
the answer is unknown he may break the negotiation (because the issue has
become meaningless) and send “break”. In case that the answer is either no or
undecided, a new literal is chosen to be send as a message.
In general, a response to a message Lt received by agent ai at round t + 1
of the negotiation, is a message Lt+1 defeasibly derived from Π
t+1
i ∪ ∆
t+1
i . The
exchange of messages proceeds in orderly fashion: agent a1 sends her messages
at odd values of t (i.e. at 1,3,...) while a2 sends hers at even values (2,4,...).
A possibility is that Lt is either no or undecided. Then, Π
t+1
i ∪∆
t+1
i must
be revised and updated according to Lt. The result of this operation of updating
is ¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i
4. There are alternative characterizations of this updating opera-
4 The next time agent i receives a message, t + 3, his knowledge base will be Π
t+3
i ∪
∆
t+3
i ≡ ¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i .tion [FKIS02], but a mandatory requirement is that it must be consistent with
the protocol of negotiation.
Since we assume that the goal of both agents is either to reach an agreement
or break up the negotiation, any suﬃcient condition that ensures such result
may be applied to deﬁne a protocol. In [Toh02] it is shown that such condition
is monotonicity, in the sense of reducing disagreements. In other words, agents
are allowed to exchange messages (without repetition) until either an agreement
is found or the negotiation breaks up.
In this sense, if until stage t the messages that have been sent back and
forth are L1,L2,...,Lt−1, the possible messages to be send from then on are
constrained by the protocol.
The following is obviously a monotonic protocol:
Protocol 31 If an agreement nor a break up is reached, the response to a mes-
sage Lt must be a Lt+1 in L\{Lj}t
j=1, where L is the set of literals that can be
defeasibly derived from Π ∪ ∆.
If such non-deterministic protocol is applied, a process of updating Π
t+1
i ∪
∆
t+1
i must be consistent with it. In this sense, if Lt is not preferentially war-
ranted, no Lj for j = 1,...,t should be used as a message up from the resulting
knowledge base ¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i .
This means that, in particular, the current beliefs must be changed. The
beliefs should no longer allow the messages sent in the previous rounds to be
considered warranted.5 One way to achieve this is by using the following proce-
dure:
Procedure 31 Consider, for a given i, the tagged trees T k
i , for k = 1,...,t.
Among those with roots marked U, choose the leaves hHk,Hki that minimize
Vi(Hk,Hk), derived from Φ
t+1
i .
For each of those leaves, choose a rule that minimizes Φ
t+1
i (µk) over all
the rules that participate in the derivation of Hk from Πt+1 ∪ Hk. Then deﬁne
¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i := (Π
t+1
i ∪ ∆
t+1
i ) \ {µ}k.
This procedure, used in the following algorithm allows to ﬁnd the updated
beliefs and choose next message:
Algorithm 31 [Update Beliefs and Select Message]
1. Deﬁne ThA,Lki for k = 1,...,t.
2. Run Procedure 3.1.
3. Find {T k
i }t
k=1 over ¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i
4. If a root is marked U go to 2. Else
(a) If ¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i = ∅, send the message “break”.
5 As said, preferences could also change, but this equivalent to replace Φi for Φ
0
i.
Although this can be easily introduced in our framework, we leave the details for an
extension of this work.(b) Else choose Lt+1 such that minimizes Φ
t+1
i (L) over those literals L that
can be preferentially warranted in ¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i .
It is immediate that:
Proposition 31 Algorithm 3.1 implements Protocol 3.1.
Proof: Trivial. If Lt is warranted, then an agreement is reached and the
selected message is “yes”, else if Lt is unknown the negotiation breaks up.
Otherwise, Algorithm 3.1 is such that if ¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i = ∅ the negotiation breaks
up, otherwise, it ensures that L1,...,Lt are not preferentially warranted in
¯ Π
t+1
i ∪ ¯ ∆
t+1
i , therefore it chooses Lt+1 ∈ L \ {Lj}t
j=1.
Notice that Algorithm 3.1 is not the only possible implementation of Pro-
tocol 3.1, since the latter just asks for monotonicity in the messages, while the
Algorithm intends to ﬁnd the best messages for agent ai.
Another result that follows is:
Proposition 32 If both agents use Algorithm 3.1 to choose messages, the ne-
gotiation either ends in an agreement or in a break up.
Proof: Algorithm 3.1 implements Protocol 3.1. We denote Lt = L \ {Lk}t
k=1.
There are two possibilities, either there exists a T such that when one of the
agents sends a message LT the other agent responds with “yes”. Alternatively,
if there is no L that may result in an agreement, as a consequence of the
Compactness Theorem for First-Order Logic there exists a T
0
< ∞ such that
LT
0
= ∅ and leads to a response “break”.
A ﬁnal consequence of using Algorithm 3.1 is that if agreements (including
break ups as degenerate agreements) are path dependent. That is, the choices
made by the agents condition further choices. Therefore, over the same knowl-
edge base, the agents may end up agreeing on diﬀerent conclusions. The following
example shows this:
Example 31 Consider the classical example in defeasible argumentation where
preferences are deﬁned for B = {0,1}, with 0 < 1. The preferences, which for
simplicity are assumed common to both agents, are indicated in parentheses
next to the corresponding pieces of information:
Π = {bird(X)–≺penguin(X) (1), penguin(tweety) (1), bird(tweety) (1)}
∆ = {¬flies(X)–≺penguin(X) (1), flies(X)–≺bird(X) (0.5)}
Agents have diﬀerent beliefs:
Π1
1 = {penguin(tweety) (1),bird(tweety) (1)}
∆1
1 = {¬flies(X)–≺penguin(X) (1)}while
Π1
2 = {bird(X)–≺penguin(X) (1), penguin(tweety) (1),}
∆1
2 = {flies(X)–≺bird(X) (0.5)}
For agent a1, there are two warranted conclusions, penguin(tweety) and
¬flies(tweety). Suppose that her message is L1 = penguin(tweety). Since it
is also a warranted conclusion for a2, he will respond with “yes”. Otherwise,
suppose that L1 = ¬flies(tweety). Since for a1 flies(tweety) is warranted he
must apply Algorithm 3.1. It follows that he has to drop the rule with lowest
preference, namely flies(X)–≺bird(X). Then,
Π2
2 = {bird(X)–≺penguin(X) (1), penguin(tweety) (1),}
∆2
2 = ∅
The only (trivially) warranted conclusions are penguin(tweety) and
bird(tweety). In the case that L2 = penguin(tweety), the response is
“yes” and the same is true if L2 = bird(tweety).
On the other hand, assume that Φ(flies(X)–≺bird(X)) = 1 while
Φ(bird(X)–≺penguin(X)) = 0.5. Accordingly, if L1 = ¬flies(tweety)
then
Π2
2 = { penguin(tweety) (1),}
∆2
2 = {flies(X)–≺bird(X) (1)}
Therefore, L2 = penguin(tweety), and the response is “yes”.
Finally, if
Π1
2 = {bird(tweety) (1)}
∆1
2 = {flies(X)–≺bird(X) (0.5)}
and L1 = penguin(tweety), the response is “break”.
4 Conclusions
We presented in this paper a framework of negotiation with DeLP extended with
preferences. An algorithm of belief updating based on the elimination of rules
ensures that agents will reach an agreement, although this agreement depends
on the particular sequence of messages chosen.
A matter of further work will be to see if a negotiation still converges to an
agreement if another mechanism of belief updating is used.5 Acknowledgments
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